Statistics speak for themselves: already in 2005, 89% of the Facebook profiles used real names whereas 61% of the profiles contained images which were suitable for direct identification. 6 According to Facebook's statistics, more than 850 million photos and more than 8 million videos are uploaded each month. Also, more than 1 billion content pieces (web links, news stories, blog posts, notes, photos, etc.) are shared each week. Given the widespread use and sharing of personal information deemed to be accurate and up-to-date, important privacy threats can derive from interactions on Facebook, the main one being the risk of "de-contextualization" of the information being provided by the participants. According to me, this "de-contextualization" threat is due to three major characteristics of Facebook: 1) the simplification of social relations, 2) the large dissemination of information and 3) the network globalization and normalization effects of Facebook. The risk of "de-contextualization" not only threatens the right to data protection, i.e. the right to control the informational identity a Human being projects in a certain context. More fundamentally it threatens the right to privacy as a Human right: the right of the Human being to be a multiple and relational self without unjustified discrimination.
In part I, I examine the various characteristics of Facebook which imply a risk of "decontextualization" of the circulating information. Part II exposes why this de-contextualization phenomenon threatens both the rights to privacy and to data protection. Finally, I argue that protecting privacy and data protection on Facebook must focus not merely on remedies and penalties for aggrieved individuals but on shaping an architecture to govern the multi-contextual data flows on the site. Given the importance of the "de-contextualization" threat, the architecture of Facebook must be build in such a way that it prevents any interference with both rights to privacy and to data protection when such interference is not strictly necessary in a democratic state.
I. The Risks of De-contextualization Deriving from Interactions on Facebook
In this paper I use the term "de-contextualization" to conceptualize what happens when behaviours or information are used in another context from that for which they were intended. As Nissembaum argues, the de-contextualization phenomenon arises when individuals do not respect contextual norms of distribution and appropriateness. 7 For example, when a behaviour appropriate with a close friend in a bar is conducted in public or at work it violates contextual norms of appropriateness. In the same way, if my boss comes to know about information that was originally intended for my girlfriend it violates contextual norms of distribution. The problematic thing about these contextual norms is that they can't precisely be defined since these derive from personal sensations about how information should circulate in the physical world, or should I say in the "offline world". Indeed, both norms of appropriateness and distribution presume a certain situational environment because the way information is divulged depends on very granular properties of that environment such as its architectural, temporal and intersubjective characteristics. 8 As an example, I would not behave in the same way with my boss in a bar at 10 pm than I would do at 8 am at work, neither would I disclose the same information at 10 pm in the same bar with my boss if my mother comes to join us. In the physical world, contextual norms of distribution and appropriateness are thus based on something typically Human: feelings.
However, as I explain in the next sections, Facebook has a completely different design than the physical world, and its architectural, temporal and inter-subjective properties can potentially create an asymmetry between users' "feelings" and the way information can be propagated. Therefore, the use of the concept of "de-contextualization" is particularly interesting in the case of Facebook since it is an environment "where worlds collide, where norms get caught in the crossfire between communities, where the walls that separate social situations come crashing down". 9
In the next sections I argue that the de-contextualization threat on Facebook is due to three of its major characteristics: 1) the simplification of social relations, 2) the large information dissemination and 3) Facebook's globalization and normalisation effects.
The Simplification of Social Relations on OSNS
According to statistics published on Facebook, an average user has 120 "friends" on the site. This means that when a user updates his profile (by uploading a picture or a video, modifying his religious or political preferences, or by changing his relational status), posts a message on a "wall" or answers a quiz, this information is, by default and on average, available to more than one hundred persons with whom the user entertains different kinds of relationships. Indeed, connections of a user on Facebook can be as diverse as family members, colleagues, lovers, real friends, bar acquaintances, old schoolmates or even unknown people. Social network theorists have discussed the relevance of relations of different depths and strengths in a person's social network. 10 Noteworthy is the fact that the application of social network theory to information disclosure highlights significant differences between the offline and the online scenarios. In the offline world, the relation between information divulgation and a person's social network is traditionally multi-faceted: "In certain occasions we want information about ourselves to be known only in a small circle of close friends, and not by strangers. In other instances, we are willing to reveal personal information to anonymous strangers, but not to those who know us better". 11 Hence, on offline social networks, people develop and maintain ties that could aproximatively be defined as weak or strong ties, but in reality these ties are extremely diverse depending on intersubjective, temporal and contextual. factors. Online social networks, on the other side, reduce these complex nuanced connections to very simplistic binary relations: "Friend or not". 12 Observing online social networks, danah boyd notes that "there is no way to determine what metric was used or what the role or weight of the relationship is. While some people are willing to indicate anyone as Friends, and others stick to a conservative definition, most users tend to list anyone who they know and do not actively dislike. This often means that people are indicated as Friends even though the user does not particularly know or trust the person". Increasingly, Facebook users thus tend to list as "Friends" anyone they do not actively hate 14 and share with these connections an incredible amount of data which can potentially be inappropriate in Facebook's heterotopical 15 context. Let's take for example a Facebook user who has 100 "Friends": 4 of them being family members, 16 "close friends", 1 lover, 4 ex-lovers, 30 old school mates, 30 acquaintances (from different contexts), 14 work colleagues and his boss. Now imagine that our user installs a third party application on Facebook to answer a funny "Are you alcoholic?" quiz and at the same time sets his "relationship status" to single. There is no doubt that the combination of these information will have a different meaning for his friends and lover than for his colleagues, his boss or his mother. From these observations derives a threat of decontextualization: the difficulty for a multi-faceted self to contextually curtail the information he wants to share to "Friends" of different contexts. Simply said, answering a "What's your favourite sexual position?" quiz can certainly provide interesting information to my girlfriend but is surely not appropriate for any of my colleagues.
With this regard, the "Friend Lists" feature provided by Facebook which enables users to organize friends into different categories is a start. The tool allows them to include and exclude groups of friends from being able to see parts of their profile and content. In our example, an aware user could group each type of "friends" into different categories he predefines and grant them different sets of permissions to information such as pictures, videos, status, messages, etc. However, by making the problem of limiting access to certain information easier by adding more specific control, Facebook also introduced more complexity and conceptual overhead for users: they now have to "categorize" their "friends". This is precisely why the "Friends Lists" feature can't be considered as accurately mimicking the way in which we all limit access to certain personal information to specific friends in the real world. Indeed, the feature looks much more like how a system administrator might set up permissions to computer resources than how information divulgation processes happen in every day life: "labelling" friends and creating "Friend Lists" doesn't happen consciously in the offline world.
The simplification of social relations on OSNS thus induces a first threat of de-contextualization of information given that the binaryc relationships on these sites can lead to breaches of contextual norms of appropriateness or norms of distribution: information divulgation will never be as granular in the online world as it is in the offline world.
The Large Information Dissemination Implied by Interactions on Facebook
Not only does the simplification of social relations on Facebook induce a threat to decontextualization, so does the way in which information can potentially be largely disseminated along the social graph. In offline scenarios, it is exceptionally unlikely that information about a person will be interesting beyond two degrees of information. In such scenarios, Duncan Watts notes that "anyone more distant than a friend of a friend is, for all intents and purposes, a stranger… Anything more than two degrees might as well be a thousand" 16 . In other words, at least in the pre-Facebook era, no one much cared about those people who were removed from us by more than two links. Strahilevitz illustrates this perfectly in the following quote:
"Extra-marital affairs are fascinating events. That said, no self-respecting person would go to a cocktail party and tell a private story about a friend of a friend of a friend who is having an adulterous affair with someone unknown to the speaker and listener. It is only if the speaker or listener know who the adulterers are, or if the details of the 14 Note that Hatebook.org, the exact opposite version of Facebook, defines itself as "an anti-social utility that disconnects you from all the things you hate". 15 For more details about Facebook as a heterotopical space, see section 2.1, p. 11. affair are particularly sordid, humorous, or memorable that the information is likely to get disseminated further through the social network. And by the time the information makes it through this chain, it seems likely that the participants' names would have dropped out of the story." 17 Thus, when dealing with events described via word-of-mouth, someone should have a "reasonable expectation of contextual integrity" beyond two links in a social network. This rule of thumb appears to hold less strongly when one moves away from offline communications and interacts on online network services such as Facebook, and this for five main reasons.
First, dissemination of information along the social graph is encouraged by the presence of a visible network of friends on every participant's profile. Whereas in the real-world, friends can spend years without knowing that they share a mutual friend, on Facebook they can very easily find out which common friends they share. Such a list also makes it easier for anyone to know which are the friends of a friend of a friend of his. Moreover, each profile of the list of friends of a friend can be "shared" and commented on the user's profile. As an example, I could go trough my connection list, pick out one of my friends, look at his friends then to the friends of his friends and finally publish the limited profile of one of them on my profile with a disgracious comment that can then again be shared and commented further trough the social graphs of my own "friends".
Secondly, Facebook is constituted by a large number of networks, and users are incited to join them in order to meet and make "friends" with other people. The biggest of these networks are the so-called "geographic networks", the Belgian one bringing more than 780.000 people together. Having joined such a network, a user can then "classify" users of a same network on the basis of criteria such as gender, age, relationship status, interests and political views. Moreover, depending on the target's privacy settings, users can then access parts or the entirety of friends of friends of friends ' profiles. 18 Another factor that can potentially cause broad information divulgation is the "tagging" feature proposed by Facebook. A tag is a keyword, often the real-name of a participant associated with or assigned to a piece of information (a picture, a video clip, etc.), thus describing the item and enabling keyword-based classification and search of information. When associated with a picture or a video, a tag directly provides a link to the represented user's profile. Here comes the classic Facebook problem: you don't login to the site for a few hours one day and photos (or other information) of the moment are suddenly posted for all friends of a friend to view, not just your close friends who shared the moment with you. Indeed, Facebook didn't create a default privacy setting that would allow users to approve or deny photo tags before they can appear on the site. 19 17 L. J. STRAHILEVITZ, op.cit, p. 47. 18 According to the article Facebook Security Fails Again published on IT-ONLINE, in 2007, the IT security and control firm Sophos revealed that members involuntarily exposed their personal data to millions of strangers, at risk of identity theft. The security company chosed randomly 200 users in the London Facebook network, which is the largest geographic network on the site, with more than 1.2 million members, and found that a staggering 75 percent allowed their profiles to be viewed by any other member, regardless of whether or not they had agreed to be friends. The reason of this unwanted divulgation of information was that even if you had previously set up your privacy settings to ensure that only friends could view your information, joining a network automatically opened your profile to every other member of the network. It is only in 2009 that Facebook changed the default privacy settings for geographical networks to avoid unwanted open profiles. 19 There is a possibility to indirectly restrict the visibility of the tagged photos by first visiting your profile privacy page and modify the setting next to "Photos Tagged of You", select the option which says "Customize…" , select the option "Only Me" and then "None of My Networks". If you would like to make tagged photos visible to A fourth worry for unwanted dissemination of information derives from "Facebook Platform for Mobile". According to Facebook's statistics, "there are currently more than 30 million active users accessing Facebook through their mobile devices. People that use Facebook on their mobile devices are almost 50% more active on Facebook than non-mobile users". 20 The biggest privacy threat of such a feature derives from the ubiquity of mobile devices that can potentially let online information enter into the offline world anytime, anywhere and anyplace. Indeed, privacy settings don't matter in the offline world: with his mobile, one of my real-world friends could easily show me the complete Facebook profile of one of his "friends" whom I completely don't know just because one of his/her characteristics were interesting in the context of our personal discussion.
Finally, the introduction of third-party applications on Facebook has opened users' personal data up to an increasingly large group of developers and marketers. According to a 2007 review 21 of the top 150 Facebook applications, nearly 91% had access to unnecessary personal data. Given the recreational nature of many top applications today, this statistic has probably not changed drastically. Users have become accustomed to authorizing even simple applications and do not know what data will be used and to whom it will be transferred prior to authorizing an application. "We're Related" is one such third-party application that has been the source of these concerns. According to one report, this application, which claims 15 million active users each month, seeks to identify and link family members who are already on the network, even if they are only distantly related: "New users are asked to give a blanket approval to let the application "pull your profile information, photos, your friends' info and other content that it requires to work". The application then appears to give itself the power to release this information to anyone else on Facebook -even if users have set stricter privacy settings to limit access to their personal data." 22 However, as indicated in Facebook's user terms, the company does not consider itself responsible for inaccurate privacy practices of third party applications developers. 23 Combined together, these five factors induce a risk of unwanted dissemination of data going beyond the "reasonable expectations of contextual integrity" of Facebook users since important information exchanged with their "friends" can potentially propagate much further than two links of information.
In the next section, I argue that this de-contextualization threat can potentially be increased by Facebook's globalization and normalization effects.
The Globalization and Normalization Effects of Facebook
Everyone has experienced the increasing pressure from connections to finally get with the program and join the network. This can partly be explained by the fact that when someone registers on Facebook, the site invites the new user to "find out which of [his] email contacts are on Facebook". Facebook then asks users for their email address and password for many of the major certain users you can choose to add them in the box under the "Some Friends" option. In the box that displays after you select "Some Friends" you can type either individual friends or friend lists. 20 See Facebook statistics on <http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics>. providers of webmail services (Yahoo, Hotmail, Gmail, etc.) . Facebook then logs on to the e-mail account, and downloads all the contacts from there.. 24 The user is then given the option of inviting all of their contacts to join Facebook. By default, all of the contacts are pre-selected: the default behaviour is thus to send messages to all of one's contacts inviting them to become friends on Facebook.
Incentives to be on the program become even more concrete when one examines the "tagging" feature proposed by Facebook. A problematic element about that feature is that even people who did not register on the network can be tagged (thus possibly by so-called friends, complete strangers or even enemies). Of course, the right of access and the right to rectification/deletion can be used if someone wants to remove a particular tag about himself, but therefore he has to first register on Facebook. This is what we could call the globalization effect of Facebook: without being on the program, someone can already be a data object defined by pictures and articles. Without even knowing it and without being able to react, someone can already be a welldocumented widely disseminated discussion topic. To become a real data subject, the data object has first to register on Facebook before being able to exercise his data protection rights. To become active actors in the control over their informational identity, people become obliged to register on the program.
Given the impressive growth of Facebook (314% in the last year), the service is increasingly becoming an every day communication tool with for example 21% of the Belgian population being registered. 25 Paradoxically, it thus becomes increasingly more abnormal not to be on Facebook than the contrary. This is what we could call the normalization effect of Facebook: a future where employers will ask themselves the question: "why is Mr X not on Facebook? That's strange...has he something to hide ?" is maybe not so far.
Having now described the three main characteristics of Facebook leading to a risk of decontextualization of personal information, in the next section I analyze the consequences of such a threat on the respect of the rights to privacy and to data protection.
II. Consequences of the Threat of De-contextualization on the Rights to Privacy and to Data Protection
The three characteristics of Facebook that I exposed −1) simplification of social relations, 2) wide dissemination of information and 3) globalization and normalization effects − can potentially lead to important risks of de-contextualization of information. Such a threat of decontextualization of personal information on Facebook can potentially affect both the right to privacy and the right to data protection of the service's users.
The links between both rights have already been seriously examined by influential authors 26 . For the purposes of our discussion, let us simply take as a starting point the mere fact that the right to privacy is traditionally seen as a "Human right" recognised to Human beings whereas the "rights to data protection" are provided to "data subjects" by the most significant legal instruments at the European level. Indeed, where privacy and the ECHR are all about Humans, Directive 95/46 24 See <http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/> 25 See statistics on <http://katrin-mathis.de/wp-mu/thesis/>. 26 Gutwirth and De Hert, for example, discussed the distinction by viewing the right to privacy as being a kind of "tool of opacity" whereas, according to the authors, the right to data protection would be a "tool of transparency". cares about data subjects. Why? The question could seem somewhat simplistic or trivial, but understanding from such an angle the respective meanings of both rights to privacy and to data protection can, I think, help us to understand in which way de-contextualization of information threatens both rights.
Consequences of the Threat of De-contextualization on Privacy as a Right of the Human Being
Recalling that privacy is a right provided to Human beings can appear to be trivial, however the term "Human" is extremely ambiguous and has known an extraordinary historical and philosophical evolution. In order to properly introduce this topic and to avoid unnecessary discussions, let us only acknowledge that a Human being cannot be reduced to a body nor to a physical person. Of course, Human rights should ideally be conferred to all bodies having Human specifications as defined by anatomy, but, historically, there is no doubt that lawyers were also influenced by philosophical conceptions of the "inner self" when designing the Human rights framework. As an example, article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights defines the Human as being "endowed with reason and conscience", recalling a very Kantian point of view according to which the definitive characteristic of the Human self was its capacity for reason. Reason, according to Kant, allowed the self to understand and order the world with certainty. In consequence, the Kantian self was conceived as an identity pole of coherent subjectivity, standing above the stream of changing experience. However, increasingly in the twentieth century, the liberal modernist notion of the self as a unitary, stable, and transparent individual has come under heavy criticism. Indeed, many postmodern and late modern theories of the self asserted that it is fractured and multiple. According to these, the self is an illusory notion constructed as static and unitary, but in reality completely fluid. 27 Evolution of these reflections lead to conceptions of the Human being as a "multiple-self" 28 which is relational, inter-subjective and context-dependent. Goffman's nuanced idea of a "cosmopolitan person" perfectly reflects the philosophical debate between unification and fragmentation of the modern self which is constantly evolving in a plurality of contexts. According to him, " In many modern settings, individuals are caught up in a variety of differing encounters…each of which may call for different forms of appropriate' behaviour…As the individual leaves one encounter and enters another, he sensitively adjusts the 'presentation of self' in relation to whatever is demanded of a particular situation. Such a view is often thought to imply that an individual has as many selves as there are divergent contexts of interaction…Yet again it would not be correct to see contextual diversity as simply and inevitably promoting the fragmentation of the self, let alone its disintegration into multiple 'selves'. It can just as well, at least in many circumstances, promote an integration of self…A person may make use of diversity in order to create a distinctive self-identity which positively incorporates elements from different settings into an integrated narrative. Thus a cosmopolitan person is one precisely who draws strength from being at home in a variety of contexts." 29 Behind the postmodern dilemma between unification and fragmentation of the self, important for the purposes of our discussion is the fact that Human beings are increasingly conceived as contextual selves constantly reinventing themselves, adopting different roles, postures and attitudes in a complex open network of networks. Taking into account this conceptual evolution of the Human self towards a contextual self, it is then interesting to analyze the evolution of the meaning of his right to privacy.
Since its acceptance as the "right to be left alone" 30 , the right to privacy has known significant developments. Interestingly, the European Court of Human Rights has asserted that it would be too restrictive to limit the notion of "private life" to an "inner circle" in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle: "Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other Human beings". 31 Privacy is now obviously conceived as a phenomenon that regards the relationships between a self and its environment/other selves. As Fried observes, "Privacy is not just one possible means among others to insure some other value, but that it is necessarily related to ends and relations of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust. Privacy is not merely a good technique for furthering these fundamental relations; rather without privacy they are simply inconceivable. They require a context of privacy or the possibility of privacy for their existence." 32 Furthermore, as "people have, and it is important that they maintain, different relationships with different people" 33 , relationships between selves are by nature extremely contextual. Therefore Nissenbaum asserted that the definitive value to be protected by the right to privacy is the "contextual integrity" 34 of a given contextual-self having different behaviors and sharing different information depending on the context in which he's evolving. With this regard, Rachels notes that:
here is a close connection between our ability to control who has access to us and to information about us, and our ability to create and maintain different sorts of social relationships with different people...privacy is necessary if we are to maintain the variety of social relationships with other people that we want to have and that is why it is important to us." 35
In a similar way, Agre defined the right to privacy as "the freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of one's own identity" 36 . Given that someone's identity-building is increasingly conceived as a progressive autonomic and narrative integration of different elements deriving from a contextual diversity, many authors tend to consider the right to privacy as a "right to selfdetermination" which is a major precondition for individual autonomy. 37 In other words, as relations with others are essential to the construction of an individual's personality, the right to privacy also encourages self-development 38 by protecting a diversity of contextualized relations from unreasonable intrusions or leaks. In such a perspective, the right to privacy can be conceived as a "right to self-determination of the contextual self" which guarantees him the possibility to act and communicate the way he contextually wants to without having to fear unreasonable de-contextualization of behaviors or information.
Let us imagine a 45 year old father working as a bank employee, who is politically involved in a left-wing anti-militarist party, who goes hunting with his friends on Saturday, goes with his family to church every Sunday and loves to analyze Playboy each Monday with a few colleagues during the morning break. Some might think that some of these context-dependent self-representations are inconsistent or incompatible between them. Others can easily imagine how inappropriate a behavior or an information from one of these contexts could appear in some of the others. But, more fundamentally, everyone will agree that none of these contexts or situations are in se illegal or harming. Here's precisely what the right to privacy is all about: showing respect for individual autonomy, even if someone's inter-contextual identity-building could seem incoherent to some of us. In this perspective, the right to privacy is not only an important precondition for individual autonomy but more generally for the persistence of a vivid democracy. Antoinette Rouvroy provides one of the best-informed versions of this claim:
"The right to privacy guarantees the possibility for the subject to think differently from the majority and to revise his first order preferences. Thus, privacy is a condition for the existence of 'subjects' capable of participating in a deliberative democracy. As a consequence, privacy also protects lawful, but unpopular, lifestyles against social pressures to conform to dominant social norms. Privacy as freedom from unreasonable constraints in the construction of one's identity, serves to prevent or combat the "tyranny of the majority". The right to privacy and the right not to be discriminated against have in common that they protect the opportunities, for individuals, to experiment a diversity of non-conventional ways of life. Privacy is itself a tool for preventing invidious discriminations and prejudices". 39
The right to privacy can thus be conceptualized as a right to contextual integrity preserving the possibility for anyone to build his own identity through differentiated relationships. The aim of such a "right to difference" is to ensure multiplicity, creation, novelty and invention in a democratic society and to avoid immobility or sterile heavy normalization. That's why decontextualization of personal information can be considered as one of the main threats to the right to privacy. Such a threat of de-contextualization is particularly present in the case of Facebook which is a platform of collapsed contexts. Indeed, the service merges every possible relationship into one single social space: friendship, politics, work, love, etc. are all mixed together in a unique environment. Therefore Facebook can be seen as what Foucault calls an heterotopia. According to the philosopher, "Heterotopias are counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality". 40 38 See ECHR, Odièvre v. France, 13 February 2003, where the Court acknowledged that the right to privacy (Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights) protects, among other interests, the right to personal development. 39 A. ROUVROY, "Privacy, Data Protection, and the Unprecedented Challenges of Ambient Intelligence", in Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology, Vol. 2, Iss. 1, 2008, p.34. 40 M. FOUCAULT, Of Other Spaces, Heterotopias, 1967. This definition, applied to Facebook, reveals all its accuracy. Indeed, Facebook's servers are situated somewhere in the US, making it possible to indicate their location in reality. Moreover, just as heterotopias, Facebook is "capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible" 41 . In this sense, Facebook can be considered as being outside of all places. Indeed, whereas in the physical world, doors separate rooms, walls muffle sound, curtains block spying eyes, where the volume of our voices during a conversation can be modulated depending on the sensitivity of the content and who is in earshot, the "de-contextualizing" architecture of Facebook is above space, and therefore makes it much more difficult to tailor our presentation to fit different situations. 42 Therefore Facebook's heterotopical architecture can potentially create an asymmetry between a user's imagined audience and a user's actual audience, simply because the platform lacks a separation of spaces. By this, the service makes it much more difficult for users to evaluate which contextual norms of appropriateness or distribution they should expect respect for when divulgating information on the site.
Here's where the phenomenon of de-contextualization on Facebook threatens the right to privacy: it threatens the possibility of the Human being to act as a contextual and relational self and prevents him to build his own identity trough differentiated relationships. By this, Facebook can also cause important discriminations and prejudices.
Consequences of the Threat of De-contextualization on Data Protection as a Right of Data Subjects
The de-contextualization phenomenon on Facebook not only threatens the right to privacy of Human beings but also the right to data protection of "data subjects". Indeed, whereas the right to privacy cares about Human beings, the most important data protection instruments create rights for "data subjects". Directive 95/46 defines a "data subject" as an identified or identifiable natural person and an "identifiable person" as one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity. A "subject of data" is thus being conceived as someone who can be identified by reference to one or more factors specific to one aspect of his identity. Therefore Agre defines the right to data protection as "the right to control over an aspect of the identity one projects to the world" 43 . Interestingly the right to data protection can thus be seen as a mean of control on a partial projection of someone's "identity", which as already mentioned is extremely contextual and relational.
For this reason, I believe that the right to data protection can be conceptualized as a right provided to "dividuals". Registered since the first Noah Webster's Dictionary (1828) until today, the term "dividual" means "divided, shared, or participated in, in common with others". The Random House Unabridged Dictionary gives the following meanings: 1) divisible or divided; 2) separate, distinct; 3) distributed, shared. Hence the English word "dividual" contains both the meanings of "shared" and "divided", basic characteristics of contextual relationships in which "differentiated" content is "shared" depending on who someone communicates to. Also, the term "dividual" has been used by Deleuze in his description of societies of control, "which no longer operate by confining people but through continuous control and instant communication" 44 European Directive (purpose limitation and data quality) can thus be interpreted as a consecration of Helen Nissenbaum's theory, according to which "a normative account of privacy in terms of contextual integrity asserts that a privacy violation has occurred when either contextual norms of appropriateness or norms of distribution have been breached". 50 In consequence, the rights of information, access, rectification and opposition can be seen as legal means of empowerment provided to "contextual dividuals" for challenging every breach of contextual norms (of appropriateness or distribution) by data controllers.
In summary, whereas the right to privacy guarantees the Human being the possibility to be multifaceted and to act contextually differently in order to ensure the perseverance of a vivid and deliberative democracy, the right to data protection can be seen as a tool to empower "contextual dividuals" with the means to ensure the contextual integrity of their informational image.
Conceptualizing the right to data protection as a right of "contextual dividuals" can, I think, help us understand why the de-contextualization phenomenon is so particularly harming for our data protection rights on a site like Facebook. Indeed, one of the prime effects of heterotopical environments such as Facebook is to artificially recompose the individuals. Quoting Foucault, "The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing crushes or subdues individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires come to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the visa-vis of power; it is I believe, one of its prime effects" 51 .
In a similar way, on Facebook, "personal information a user posts online, combined with data outlining the users actions and interactions with other people, can create a rich profile of that person's interests and activities". 52 The multi-contextual collation of all of my and my friends' contributions can thus easily paint an individual picture of me. Hence, by merging every possible contexts into one single informational environment, Facebook negates the existence of our dividualities, and by consequence denies our rights as dividuals.
In other words, the purpose described on Facebook's main page -"Facebook helps you connect and share with the people in your life" -is far too broad to determine which data are adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation with that purpose. If Facebook's architecture destroys contextual integrity, it is because the most fundamental characteristics of its design directly conflicts with norms of distribution and appropriateness. Indeed, global multi-contextuality cannot be concealed with a right to data protection because when the purpose of a service is defined as "everything" then all data can be considered as adequate, relevant and not excessive and every further distribution can be considered as compatible.
Conclusion
The de-contextualization phenomenon on Facebook certainly constitutes a major threat to both rights to privacy and to data protection. European regulators share a similar point of view. Indeed, in its recent opinion "on online social networking", the Article 29 Working Party stressed that one of its key concerns was "the dissemination and use of information available on SNS for other 50 H. NISSENBAUM, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, Washington Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 1, 2004, p.138. 51 In doing so, European authorities could impose less multi-contextual content in OSNS by demanding the operators of such sites to curtail their architecture in accordance with each user's specific intents. As an example, before a user registers on Facebook, a question could be asked such as "For which purpose do you intend to use Facebook?" with a list of answers such as "Commercial purpose", "political purpose", "dating purpose" , "work relations", "real-world friendship", etc. After having determined more precisely the purpose of each user's registration, Facebook should then collect only adequate, relevant and non-excessive data in relation with that purpose. If a user wants to use the service for multiple purposes, multiple accounts should be encouraged. More generally, Facebook operators should consider carefully "if they can justify forcing their users to act under their real identity rather than under a pseudonym". 60 When the specific purpose of use doesn't require the real name, pseudonyms should be encouraged.
Reconstructing places inside Facebook is an absolute necessity for users to evaluate which contextual norms of distribution and appropriateness they can expect. Such a claim is not only useful to respect each user's dividuality as regards his right to data protection. More fundamentally it is essential to allow users to construct their identity as multiple and relational selves and hence to act as Human beings.
